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Article 8

"
Euthanasia: Continuing the Conversion
Lisa Sowle Cahill

The author is an assistant professor in the department of theology
at Boston College. She has contributed several articles to Linacre in
the past.

There continues to appear in the Linacre Quarterly evidence of
lively interest in debating the possible justifiability of direct euthanasia. Judging by his recent article, Richard Sherlock (5/80) even
considers my own contribution to that discussion (2/77; 11 / 77) to be
worthy of further attention. I appreciate his constructive criticism of
my suggestion that euthanasia might be morally legitimate in some
rare cases, as I have been of the previous responses of Profs. James G.
Colbert (8/77; 5/78) and Robert J . Comiskey (5/77). It might nonetheless be helpful to clarify a few points with regard to which there
may be some misunderstanding.
First, I would concur with Sherlock that there is no private realm in
which agents bear no responsibility for the effects of their actions on
the common good. By indicating (e.g., in response to Comiskey) that
there is a distinction between the question of the moral justifiability
of euthanasia and that of public policy regarding it, I meant only to
suggest that the acts of individuals and public policies may have
different impacts on the common good, both qualitatively and quantitatively. The question of prudent legislation generally is related to but
distinct from that of the morality of the sorts of acts which the law
regards. To take a less controversial illustration, most would agree that
it is morally acceptable to refuse or withhold life-prolonging treatment
under certain conditions. Yet, even among those who grant this possibility, there is discussion of whether it would be prudent or
imprudent to make the " Living Will" a legally binding document.
Would legislation enforcing the Living Will lead to more abuses than it
would prevent, or would the opposite be true? To conclude that it is
preferable to leave adherence to Living Wills to the discretion of
family members and medical staff is not to say that decisions about
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prolonging the lives of terminally ill patients have no impact on the
common good, but only that any additional impact which might be
had by general laws regarding these decisions ought to be considered
prudently before the laws are enacted. Thus, even though I would in
principle justify exceptional instances of euthanasia, I would at least
hesitate before recommending that family, physicians, etc., ought to
be legally protected in their performance of such acts. This is a question which bears further discussion.
Second, Sherlock clarifies the fact that Thomas Aquinas (to whom I
appealed in support of my original argument) rejects suicide, of which
voluntary euthanasia can be considered a subcategory. I have not
intentionally suggested the contrary. However, I would say that
although suicide in general is rejected by Thomas, direct killing of the
innocent in certain narrowly defined cases, not explicitly considered
by Thomas, is not inconsistent with his general principles. In particular, I think some relevant premises of Thomistic ethics are that
human nature is characterized by rationality and freedom, that the
highest goods for persons are spiritual goods, that the only "absolute"
is God, and that the only evil "absolutely" prohibited is moral evil or
sin, a deliberate turning away from God. My basic argument is that
while the killing of the innocent is usually, even almost always, a sin,
it may not be a sin without exception if a good even higher than life is
at stake. (This, of course, is not to claim that Thomas himself would
agree with the way I have interpreted " Thomistic" principles or
applied them to the case at hand.)
To reply a little differently, I do not think that the fact that
Thomas prohibits suicide necessarily entails that he considers life an
"absolute," as suggested by Sherlock and Colbert. I would define an
"absolute" as something which must be sought absolutely, something
which commands human effort unconditionally, in any and all circumstances, whatever other goods are at stake. At least as far as I can
determine, "life" in the temporal and physiological sense has never
been an absolute in the Christian tradition. This is apparent from the
fact that the duty to preserve life always has been a limited one. Thus
I judge that Thomas's rejection of suicide is not equivalent to his
absolutizing of life. Rather, it is a statement about what means may
legitimately be used to terminate life, or what the justifying reasons
for causing death might be. My difference with the specific conclusions drawn in the Summa Theologiae (II-II, Q. 64, a. 5) are on this
level (can direct killing ever be a justifiable means of bringing about
death of an "innocent" patient? For what cause?) rather than on the
issue of whether life is an "absolute."
Thirdly, I would like to distance myself from any equation or
confusion of a "quality of life" standard with a "social usefulness"
standard, whether for withdrawing treatment or for direct euthanasia.
I consider this a most important point, and one which needs to be
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brought to the foreground of this series of exchanges. To say that
continued physical existence is no longer of appreciable value to the
patient is not to say that the patient is no longer of any value, or no
longer has the dignity which makes his or her interests and rights
(including life) worthy of perfection. Rather, it is to ask what action is
now in the best interest and most protective of the dignity of this
individual. This distinction is one which, following Richard
McCormick, I have made and repeated before. I would say that the
very possibility of deciding to discontinue life support (to withdraw
"extraordinary means") depends on the possibility of making such a
decision. In some cases, it becomes necessary to decide whether continued life really is in keeping with the dignity and interests of a certain patient. This does not strike me as an area of particular controversy. The real controversy is over whether direct killing can ever be
an acceptable means of seeking death.
It seems neither necessary nor usually justifiable to say that those
who argue (like myself and McCormick) that continued life is sometimes not "worthwhile" to the patient, are also arguing that the
person in question no longer has dignity and "worth" in himself or
herself, or even (quite secondarily), to others. I take it that Pope Pius
XII is making the same point in " The Prolongation of Life," i.e., that
life can at some point cease to be of sufficient quality, judged from
the patient's point of view, to ground an obligation to preserve it. He
amplifies his statement that it is obligatory only to use "ordinary"
means because "a more strict obligation would be too burdensome,"
by adding that "life, health, all temporal activities are in fact subordinated to spiritual ends" (The Pope Speaks 4 [1957], p. 394). Pope
Pius, of course, never would have allowed that direct killing could be a
licit means of terminating life. That is where I am making a departure
and a different argument, one which must be considered on its own
merits, not on the merits of utilitarian evaluations of the protection
due the terminally or chronically ill.
Although I have expressed reservations about certain interpretations
of my article, I remain receptive to colleagues such as Colbert,
Comiskey, and Sherlock who are willing to engage in conversation
about this very serious issue, and am open to criticisms or refinements
of my own position. The familiar observation of St. Thomas, that
"although there is necessity in the general principles, the more we
descend to matters of detail, the more frequently we encounter
defects" (ST, I-II, Q. 94, a. 4), continues to inspire succeeding generations of ethicists to proceed in a modest and irenic frame of mind.
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